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Part Two: Political, Diplomatic and Military Issues
Some Issues Surrounding the Evaluation of the  
Trần Troṇg Kim Cabinet
Motoo Furuta?Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo
Introduction
There have been no systematic studies in the past concerning the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet that exist-
ed from April to August 1945. Under the circumstances, the publication of Nội các Trần Trọng Kim: 
Bản chất, vai trò và vị trí lịch sử (Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet: Its role and historical significance) by Pro-
fessor Phạm Hồng Tung in 2009 was of considerable significance.1 Professor Tung?s book is the out-
come of comprehensive research exclusively addressing the Kim Cabinet, published in Vietnam for the 
first time. Not only that, however, the book draws attention as the most systematic re-evaluation of the 
Kim Cabinet when the majority of domestic scholarly arguments in Vietnam have been dominated by 
complete negation of the administration?s significance. In this book, although Professor Tung ac-
knowledges that the Kim Cabinet was ?bù nhìn? (puppet) formed according to Japanese policies, he 
points out that the Cabinet was not composed of ?tay sai? (henchmen), but rather was an administra-
tion with a reformist orientation and that the majority of the members in the central government were 
technocrats with a ?spirit of the people.?
Professor Tung?s argument in his book, based on the studies conducted in and outside Vietnam is 
quite convincing; however, there seem to be some issues that will need further consideration. The fol-
lowing are some of the issues.
1.?Findings of previous studies of the Kim Cabinet
The evaluation of the Kim Cabinet has been quite controversial and continues to produce diﬀerent 
opinions. With the publication of Professor Tung?s book, it is safe to say that an international consen-
sus is beginning to form on the following points.
?  The Kim Cabinet was formed due to a change in Japanese governance policies after the coup de force 
against the French colonial government in Indochina. The change of policy was from a serious con-
sideration of the possibility of replacing Emperor Bảo Đại and replacing him with Cường Để to the 
decision to retain Bảo Đại. In this context, the Kim Cabinet was formed according to Japanese poli-
cy and was only able to exist within the limits of what was permissible within the framework of 
1 Phạm Hồng Tung, Nội các Trần Trọng Kim: Bản chất, vai trò và vị trí lịch sử (Hà Nội: NXB Chính trị Quốc gia, 2009).
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Japanese military authority.
?  Trần Trọng Kim was one of the ?players? in the hands of Japan, but he was an individual who kept 
his distance from those conventional pro-Japanese elements, such as Cường Để, Ngô Đình Diệm, 
and the Patriotic Party in Hanoi. The majority of the Cabinet members were not pro-Japan politi-
cians, but rather nationalistic technocrats and intellectuals with little experience in politics. The 
Kim Cabinet was born in a context where Japan emphasized the ?independence? of Vietnam as 
merely a formality, and did not expect the government?s aggressive cooperation in the war.
?  The Kim Cabinet implemented reforms that would be passed down to the future Democratic Re-
public of Vietnam, which included changes of street names used in the French colonial period, the 
formation of a patriotic youth movement, and the use of quốc ngữ (Romanized Vietnamese) in edu-
cation instead of French.
?  Nonetheless, it was inevitable to have limitations as a government formed with support from Japan 
immediately before the defeat of Japan. Therefore, the Kim Administration was not fully competent 
to deal with important issues such as resolution of the famine that Vietnam was facing at the time.
2.?National liberation and the ?pro-Japan orientation?
Debates over the events of World War Two are often based on the schematic overview of ?fascism vs. 
anti-fascism? which is the logic of the ?winners? or the Allies in the war. If fascism was an enemy of the 
national liberation struggle worldwide, then the governments that cooperated with Japan in the fas-
cism camp must by and large be ?antinational? governments. This perspective may be applicable for 
the regions where Japan was a unilateral aggressor, such as East Asia. China was invaded by Japan, a 
fascist power, and thus the national liberation movement to resist the Japanese can be considered part 
of the worldwide anti-fascism movement. In this context, any compromise with the Japanese invasion 
was ?antinational?; therefore it is easily understandable that the Wang Jingwei administration was neg-
atively evaluated as ?Chinese traitors.?
On the other hand, in regions like Southeast Asia, where before the outbreak of World War Two, 
many countries had been under the colonial rule of European powers belonging to the anti-fascism 
camp, the situation was not that simple. For nationalists in these regions, if one tried to be loyal to an-
ti-fascism or ?international justice,? it was inevitable to take a stance of cooperation with the colonial 
masters who had no intention of giving up power. On the other hand, if one tried to be loyal to the na-
tional liberation movement against the colonial power, one could choose to cooperate with Japan, 
which attacked Western colonial governments, while being fully aware that it belonged to the fascist 
camp. In this case, one might become ?cooperative with Japan? or ?pro-Japanese? precisely because one 
was being a ?nationalist? or loyal to ?national liberation,? which was a challenge to overcome.
The author has no intention at all of showing sympathy for the argument that Japan?s war in South-
east Asia during World War Two was meant to liberate the people of the region from colonial rule. 
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essary for Japan to be engaged in the war for a long time. There were only limited war resources avail-
able in Southeast Asia for Japan as it was fighting against China and the US at the same time, thus the 
cooperation of the local people was necessary in order to dominate the region. The Southeast Asian 
countries had provided many human resources for the wars fought by their colonial masters at the 
time of World War One, which was part of the reason why diﬀerent peoples raised the issues of 
?self-government? and ?self-determination? after the war. However, in World War Two, it was no lon-
ger possible for foreign powers such as colonial masters or Japan to gain cooperation from the nation-
alists or from ordinary people unless some form of ?independence? was promised. This was the context 
for the Japanese eﬀort to acquire cooperation from the nationalists by putting forth the slogan ?Libera-
tion of Greater East Asia? and dangling the prospect of ?granting independence? although there was no 
reality to it.
The conflicting positions, as mentioned above, between the local nationalists and Japan that existed 
in the Southeast Asia during World War Two generated complicated relationships. The stance of 
?pro-Japan? nationalists in the Southeast Asia seems to have been roughly divided into two types. The 
first type was the ?pro-Japan? group that sympathized with Japan?s ?Pan-Asianism? and had consistent 
and strong expectations of the Japanese role in achieving separation from European colonial rule. Ar-
temio Ricarte of the Philippines and Cường Để of Vietnam as well as their successors may be included 
in this category. Under the influence of Japan?s imperialistic behavior after the Russo?Japanese War, 
this group of ?pro-Japan? elements had not had much influence before World War Two. In case of Viet-
nam, the dual regime of Japan and Vichy France that continued during the war prevented the ?pro-Ja-
pan? elements from expanding their power.
The second type of ?pro-Japan? nationalists had diﬀerent perspectives from the first group?s long-
term expectations for Japan. They were battling against the colonial government, which constituted the 
immediate enemy at the beginning of the war, while toward the end of the war they were predicting an 
attack by the colonial masters to regain power. Under those circumstances, they cooperated with Ja-
pan, which was the short-term ?winner,? by accepting its promise of ?granting independence.? Rather 
than having genuine trust in Japan, this group of nationalists was confident that Japan would not stay 
for a long time, unlike the European colonial masters, because it would eventually be defeated. Sukar-
no of Indonesia, who decided to give Japan ?temporary? cooperation, may be included in this group. 
They took a stance of ?using Japan as a means to resist the colonial powers and gain independence.? 
Many ?pro-Japan? nationalists in the Southeast Asia during the war are categorized as the second type, 
which may include the ?pro-Japan? orientation of the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet in Vietnam.
This type of ?pro-Japan? orientation is not contrary to being ?nationalist,? in principle. Therefore, 
they were seldom accused of being ?traitors? after the war in Southeast Asia. However, in the postwar 
period when anti-fascism became the worldwide doctrine, the fact that this type of ?pro-Japan? nation-
alist had cooperated with Japan during the war became an internationally embarrassing history. After 
70 years have passed since the end of World War Two, we are now able to move away from the ?fascism 
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vs. anti-fascism? binary. This may be the circumstances behind the recent orientation of re-evaluating 
the governments formed in compliance with Japanese policies, such as the Kim Cabinet.
3.??Puppet? and ?Tool?
Professor Tung?s argument is that the Kim Cabinet was Japan?s ?puppet? (bù nhìn), but was never its 
?tool? or ?henchman? (tay sai). Professor Đinh Xuân Lâm, on the other hand, argues that the Kim Cab-
inet was no doubt a ?pro-Japan government,? but that the assessment of it as either a ?puppet? or a 
?tool? may not be applicable.2 The issue to be considered here may be the definition of the words 
?bù nhìn? and ?tay sai.? ??Puppet? refers to governments which operate only within the constraints of 
the policies formulated by a separate authority having real power. The Kim Cabinet was Japan?s 
?puppet? as a consequence of Japan?s ?granting of independence? during the war, similar to the govern-
ments formed in Burma and the Philippines, and the author has no objection to the term. The Viet-
namese term ?bù nhìn,? however, means ?scarecrow,? while the Japanese equivalent (kairai) means 
?marionette.? ?Puppet government? in Japanese gives the impression that the government is subjugated 
by Japan, which does not seem to be applicable to the Kim Cabinet. The nuance of the Vietnamese 
term ?scarecrow government? may be closer to what it really was.
As reasons for the assessment that the Kim Cabinet was not the ?tool? or ?henchman? of the Japa-
nese, Professor Tung argues that Japan would not have formed a government such as the Kim Cabinet 
if it hoped the government would play an aggressive role as its ?tool,? and also that the Kim govern-
ment did not enforce a policy of contributing aggressively to the Japanese war eﬀort. He also argues 
that the Kim Cabinet was diﬀerent from the Ba Maw administration in Burma and the Laurel adminis-
tration in the Philippines in that sense. This argument seems generally convincing.
4.?Diﬀerent Views/Same mind?dị kiến đồng tâm?
Since the beginning of đổi mới, Vietnamese historians have criticized the perspective that the Com-
munist Party had dominated ?true nationalism? (in Vietnamese term ?bona fide patriotism? or chủ ng-
hĩa yêu nước chân chính) after its foundation in the 1930s. New opinions are urging people to recog-
nize the existence of ?various/diverse nationalisms.?3 The re-evaluation argument of the Kim Cabinet 
by Professor Tung may belong to this trend in a broad sense. He argues that there were ?progressive 
and patriotic people? who joined the Kim Cabinet and that:
They had a good understanding of the situation and were aware that Japan was already in a des-
perate situation in World War Two. Yet, they agreed to join the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet in an at-
2 See Đinh Xuân Lâm, ?Nội các Trần Trọng Kim với Trường Thanh niên tiền tuyến Huế năm 1945? in Trường Thanh niên Huế-
1945 (Hà Nội: NXB Công an Nhân dân, 2008).
3 See, for example, Dương Trung Quốc, ?Cách mạng tháng Tám 1945: từ hiện thực đến nhận thức,? Nghiên Cứu Lịch Sử, số 
4-1990.
?     ?
Motoo Furuta
128
tempt to fight and to work for independence and for the people?s benefit, and make some progres-
sive reforms by taking advantage of the conditions for the sake of the country and the people, out 
of their patriotic passion. Their participation prevented the reactionary pro-Japanese elements 
from taking part in the government to hold power, contributed in blocking the pro-Japan ele-
ments in the Cabinet to secretly become ?tools? of the Japanese, and at the same time, made an ef-
fort to inspire the people?s patriotism and to propose and to a certain degree attempt to imple-
ment some progressive reforms. These should be considered as positive factors.?4
This evaluation, however, seems contradictory to the following argument made by Professor Tung in 
his other article. The article says:
These people [patriots who joined the Kim Cabinet] assumed that they could depend on the 
Japanese and take advantage of the opportunity to establish and enforce the basis of actual inde-
pendence. They especially assumed that they could inspire the people?s patriotism by making use 
of the conditions at the time. This is precisely the point that should be addressed. Participation in 
the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet and the dependence on Japan people were the mistakes they made. 
The reason for that is considering the situation of World War Two at the time, it was inevitable 
that the Trần Trọng Kim Cabinet was deemed to be on the side of the pro-Axis Powers, and if that 
is the case, the Cabinet would lose political legitimacy with the defeat of the Axis and also lose the 
ground to negotiate with the Allies under international law.5
It is true with no doubt, as Professor Tung points out, that it would be inevitable for the pro-Japan 
government to lose its political legitimacy in international circles with the Allied victory. The author 
agrees that the fact of the Việt Minh choosing to ?overthrow? the Kim Cabinet, in other words to 
launch their revolution instead of choosing ?collaboration? with the Cabinet, was of great significance 
in terms of establishing a government in Vietnam which would be able to claim the country?s legitima-
cy vis-à-vis the Allies.
Professor Tung contends that it was a wrong decision for the intellectuals to take part in the Kim 
Cabinet or ?pro-Japan government? in April 1945, made by misjudging the forecast of the situation 
when the big picture of the war should have been conclusive. However, the author is skeptical about 
this argument, feeling that only because the patriotic intellectuals joined the Kim Cabinet by making a 
?wrong decision,? the Cabinet did not develop as a power to take a hostile stance toward the Việt Minh 
and radically confront the revolutionary movement. Instead, they played a role in the Cabinet to en-
4 Phạm Hồng Tung, Nội các Trần Trọng Kim, p. 345.
5 Phạm Hồng Tung, ?Trao đổi về một số ý kiến liên quan đến lịch sư ̉ Nội các Trần Trọng Kim và Cách mạng tháng Tám,? Nghiên 
Cứu Lịch Sử, số 424, 8-2011; see also the same author?s ?Hoàng Xuân Hãn với Nội các Trần Trọng Kim,? Xưa và Nay, số 328?
329, 4-2009 and ?Nội các Trần Trọng Kim và Cách mạng tháng Tám,? Xưa và Nay, số 361, 8-2010.
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courage the transfer of power to the Việt Minh at the height of the movement as the Japanese defeat 
was becoming highly likely.
The author does not intend to deny the leadership of the Indochinese Communist Party and the Việt 
Minh at the time of the August Revolution in 1945, and thinks it would not have been feasible for the 
Việt Minh and the Kim Cabinet to ?collaborate? in terms of political administration. However, he 
thinks that some aspects of the August Revolution that were quite populist may have been the outcome 
of a ?merging? of the Việt Minh movement, consistently pursuing an anti-fascist or anti-Japan stance, 
with a nationalism which was of a diﬀerent type from the Việt Minh, and sought to ?win independence 
by using Japan? at the time of the coup in March 1945. Vũ Đình Hòe was the chief editor of Thanh 
Nghi ̣ imagazine and one of the main members of the New Vietnamese Association (Tân Việt Nam Hội) 
which supported the Kim Cabinet. In the context earlier mentioned, his view that the relationship be-
tween the Việt Minh supporters within the Thanh Nghi ̣ group and the Kim Cabinet supporters was a 
case of ?diﬀerent views/same mind? (having the same ultimate goal, but a diﬀerent way of reaching it) 
may be a fair evaluation.
In other words, it is the author?s view that participation in the Việt Minh by the Thanh Nghi ̣  intellec-
tuals should be interpreted as a ?merging? of two main streams (?independence by defeating Japan? 
and ?independence by using Japan?), each having a reasonable base of support, rather than as people 
walking on the ?wrong path? being absorbed by the ?right path.? Of course, I have no objection to de-
fining the Việt Minh and the diﬀerent type of nationalism as a ?mainstream? and ?side stream? respec-
tively, since the ?merging? was under the initiative of the Việt Minh. Yet I cannot help but imagine that 
this ?side stream? must have been enormous.
